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Anonymity and pseudonymity: Free speech’s problem 
children 
 
Peter Coe* 
 
Through comparative analysis of United States, English, German and 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, this article considers 
the viability of relying exclusively on either speaker or audience 
interests to underpin a free speech right within the context of 
anonymous and pseudonymous social media and online speech. It 
argues that this approach, which has hitherto been applied in these 
jurisdictions, can lead to a ‘double-edged sword’: on the one side, 
pursuant to audience interests, people may be dissuaded from 
participating in the exchange of information and ideas, because their 
anonymity or pseudonymity is not protected; on the other side, a 
constitutionally protected right to free speech based entirely on speaker 
interests could inadvertently protect unwanted and damaging speech. 
 
Introduction 
 
It has been recognised, both by legal scholars, and within the context of legal practice, 
that social media, and the internet generally, facilitates anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression.1 This article begins by briefly introducing the concepts of 
speaker and audience interests. It does this by setting out, in broad terms, the 
arguments that are analysed in detail throughout this article in favour and against 
these conflicting interests. The following section sets out how free speech is treated in 
England, in the United States and by the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’). It establishes that English2 jurisprudence has traditionally treated free 
speech, and by extension anonymous and pseudonymous expression, not as a right, 
but rather as a liberty, in that it exists only where its exercise is not restricted by law; 
a position predominantly based on audience interests, rather than that of the speaker. 
It argues that this position has evolved to an extent. Consequently, a right to free 
speech, and therefore anonymous and pseudonymous expression, does, in fact, exist 
as part of the free speech guarantee. However, this right is not absolute and, as a 
result, is only subject to a level of protection. This view is then compared with the 
                                                
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Aston Law School, Aston University (UK); Barrister, East Anglian 
Chambers and Cornwall Street Chambers; Consultant Lawyer, Addleshaw Goddard (AG Integrate). 
The author would like to thank Dr Paul Wragg (University of Leeds), Dr James Brown and Dr Gayatri 
Patel (Aston University) and the Media & Arts Law Review’s editors and anonymous reviewers for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 For legal scholarship, see generally Saul Levmore, ‘The Internet’s Anonymity Problem’ in Saul 
Levmore and Martha C Nussbaum (eds), The Offensive Internet (Harvard University Press, 2010) 50; 
Jamie Bartlett, The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld (Random House, 2014) ch 2; Eric 
Barendt, Anonymous Speech (Hart Publishing, 2016) ch 6; Bruce Baer Arnold, ‘Has Social Media 
Really Shifted the Line Between Personal and Private Forever?’ on Inforrm’s Blog (13 October 2016) 
<https://inforrm.org/2016/10/13/has-social-media-really-shifted-the-line-between-personal-and-private-
forever-bruce-baer-arnold/>. In relation to UK legal practice, see the Director of Public Prosecution’s 
comments relating to Crown Prosecution Service guidelines on prosecuting online crimes, including 
trolling: BBC News, Internet Trolls Targeted With New Legal Guidelines (10 October 2016) 
<www.bbc.com/news/uk-37601431>. 
2 References to ‘English law’ mean the law and jurisprudence of England and Wales. 
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polarised position of the US (and to an extent, Germany) in which exists a clearly 
recognised speaker interests-orientated right to anonymous and pseudonymous 
speech, which is subject to constitutional protection. What is apparent from the 
Strasbourg case law is that protection afforded for anonymous and pseudonymous 
expression falls short of an absolute right. Consequently, at present at least, it seems 
to sit, rather opaquely, somewhere between the two sides. This feeds in to an 
examination of the problems that are symptomatic of relying exclusively on either 
speaker or audience interests at the expense of the other. It is argued that, particularly 
in the modern context of online and social media expression, this bifurcated approach, 
which has hitherto been applied in England, Europe and the US, can lead to a ‘double-
edged sword’: on the one side, pursuant to audience interests, people may be 
dissuaded from participating in the exchange of information and ideas, because their 
anonymity or pseudonymity is not protected; on the other side, a constitutionally 
protected right to free speech based entirely on speaker interests could inadvertently 
protect unwanted and damaging speech. This argument is considered through the lens 
of three specific harms3 that can emanate from anonymous and pseudonymous speech 
which are, arguably, better regulated by an audience-orientated approach. 
 
Introducing the concepts of speaker and audience interests 
 
As set out above, this article considers the contrasting positions of English, European 
and US jurisprudence in respect of reliance on speaker or audience interests. What 
these concepts mean in practice will depend on whether they are, in any given 
context, underpinned by free speech or privacy rationales. By way of introducing 
these concepts, the following paragraph sets out the broad arguments in favour and 
against the competing interests. These arguments are applied and analysed in-depth 
throughout the article. 
The privacy rationale for anonymity and pseudonymity underpins the right to keep 
certain information secret, including the speaker’s identity.4 From a freedom of 
expression rationale perspective, protecting the speaker interests, by preserving their 
anonymity or pseudonymity, will encourage them, and others, to speak more freely, 
and therefore will facilitate the dissemination of more information; if they are 
permitted to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously they do not need to fear 
harassment or prosecution.5 So far as audience interests are concerned, there are 
conflicting arguments. On the one hand, it can be said that the anonymity or 
pseudonymity of the speaker can benefit the audience, in so far as it promotes free 
speech, as an anonymous or pseudonymous speaker is more inclined to impart 
information to the audience for the reasons set out above. On the other hand, the 
audience interest will usually favour transparency, for the following reasons: (i) 
knowing the identity of the speaker enables the audience to evaluate the speaker’s 
                                                
3 The three harms considered are: (i) the absence of ‘responsible’ intermediaries; (ii) the proliferation 
of ‘fake news’; and (iii) the fact that victims of, for instance, cyber-bullying, hate crime and defamation 
are not able to identify the origin of the communication. 
4 See David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/29/32 (22 May 2015) [16]ff; Jan Oster, 
European and International Media Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 47. The privacy rationale 
for anonymity and pseudonymity is considered in light of Eady J’s judgment in Author of a Blog v 
Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EMLR 22 (‘Author of a Blog’). 
5 Oster, European and International Media Law, above n 4; Richard Arnold and Mira T Sundara Rajan, 
‘Do Authors and Performers Have a Legal Right to Pseudonymity’ (2017) 9(2) Journal of Media Law 
189, 198. 
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veracity; (ii) if the speaker’s identity is known they are more likely to express 
themselves responsibly, and less likely to engage in harmful, offensive, irresponsible 
and damaging speech; and (iii) remedial action and/or prosecution with respect to 
damaging, offensive and harmful speech is easier to facilitate if the identity of the 
speaker is known.6 
 
Anonymous and pseudonymous speech: a polarisation of law 
and jurisprudence 
 
Through recourse to both statute and case law relating, where possible, to online and 
social media expression, this section considers how the respective law has been 
applied to anonymous speech. In doing so, it looks at jurisdictions that have opposing 
views as to the extent to which such expression is protected. 
 
The view from England and the European Court of Human Rights: 
a qualified right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech 
 
In his book Anonymous Speech,7 Barendt provides a detailed history of anonymous 
and pseudonymous speech in England. What is clear is that, despite this established 
tradition, and unlike the US, where a strong constitutional right to anonymous speech 
has emerged, in England an absolute right is not recognised.8 This position derives 
from how freedom of expression has historically been treated under English law: as a 
bare or residual liberty rather than a right, existing only where the law does not 
restrict its exercise.9 Thus, traditionally at least, the ‘freedom lives … in the gaps of 
the criminal and civil law’.10 However, as illustrated by cases such as Brutus v 
Cozens11 and Redmond-Bate v DPP,12 a stronger principle of free speech has been 
applied by the courts to narrowly interpret legislation so that the respective statute’s 
interference with freedom of expression is minimised. Equally, a common law right to 
free speech has been established by jurisprudence relating to, for instance, the creation 
and development of defences of fair comment and public interest privilege to libel 
                                                
6 Arnold and Rajan, above n 5, 198. 
7 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, ch 2. 
8 For the US and German positions, see below. This view on the positions of English and US law is 
supported by Arnold and Rajan, above n 5, 197. 
9 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 81, 89. Barendt provides examples of laws such as obscenity, 
libel and contempt of court, which have restricted the application of freedom of expression. 
10 Ibid. 
11 [1973] AC 854. The House of Lords held that the word ‘insulting’, pursuant to s 5 of the Public 
Order Act 1936, 1 Edw 8 and 1 Geo 6, c 6, should not be interpreted to penalise the use of offensive 
language during an anti-apartheid demonstration at Wimbledon. 
12 [2000] HRLR 249. The case related to three women Christian fundamentalists who were preaching 
from the steps of Wakefield Cathedral. Fearing a breach of the peace amongst the crowd, a police 
officer asked the women to stop, and subsequently arrested them for wilfully obstructing an officer in 
the execution of his duty contrary to s 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 (UK). The Court of Appeal held 
that the police had no right to stop citizens engaging in lawful conduct, unless there were grounds to 
fear that it would, by interfering with the rights or liberties of others, provoke violence which in those 
circumstances might not be unreasonable. Accordingly, the preachers were entitled to say things which 
members of their audience may find irritating or controversial, but they did not threaten or provoke 
violence. As a result, the police officer was not acting in the execution of his duty when he told them to 
stop. 
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actions.13 The protection afforded to freedom of expression was augmented further by 
the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), including 
the art 10 right to freedom of expression, into English law by the Human Rights Act 
1998 (‘HRA 1998’). Pursuant to HRA 1998 s 6(1), the courts must take account of the 
right when developing the common law. Similarly, s 3 imposes an obligation on the 
judiciary to interpret legislation in conformity with art 10. As a result, it is no longer 
correct to regard free speech as a mere residual liberty.14 
How do these developments relate to online speech and, in particular, social media 
expression, in the context of anonymous and pseudonymous communication? As set 
out above, it is submitted that, as is the case with the print and broadcast media, there 
is, under English law, a right, albeit not an absolute one, to communicate 
anonymously and pseudonymously online and via social media.15 However, this type 
of communication is subject to the same legal restrictions that can be applied to the 
traditional media, such as public order laws, laws relating to hate speech, obscenity 
laws, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK)16 and, more specifically, s 127 
of the Communications Act 2003 (UK)17 and ss 3218 and 3319 of the Criminal Justice 
and Courts Act 2015 (UK). In the context of civil liability and, in particular, the 
protection of reputation, s 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) provides website 
operators with a defence to defamation actions where an operator did not, itself, post 
the allegedly defamatory imputation on the website. The defence will operate so long 
as the claimant can identify the speaker who posted the imputation, or the operator 
takes steps to provide the claimant with the speaker’s full name and address or, if the 
speaker prefers, to remove the statement from the website.20 Consequently, the only 
way anonymous speakers will be able to keep their defamatory statements on websites 
is with the website operator’s assistance. This is unlikely as the operator is then, by 
default, exposed to liability. Thus, these provisions, relating to both criminal and civil 
liability, appear to suggest that online anonymous communication is, to an extent, 
                                                
13 See, eg, Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 WLR 743; Spiller v Joseph [2011] 1 AC 852 
[107]–[108]; Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127; Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe 
[2007] 1 AC 359. 
14 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 90. 
15 The existence of such a right is demonstrated by s 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK) which 
provides that a court cannot compel a person to disclose, nor is a person guilty of contempt of court for 
refusing to disclose, the source of information contained within a document for which that person is 
responsible, unless the court is satisfied that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national 
security or for the prevention of disorder or crime. 
16 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech’ (2012) 71 
Cambridge Law Journal 355, 357–65. 
17 This provision makes it an offence to send through a public electronic communications network a 
message which is ‘grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character’. For analysis of 
this provision see Peter Coe, ‘The Social Media Paradox: An Intersection with Freedom of Expression 
and the Criminal Law’ (2015) 24(1) Information & Communications Technology Law 16, 31–5. See 
also DPP v Woods (Unreported, Chorley Magistrates Court, 8 October 2012); Chambers v DPP [2013] 
1 All ER 149. 
18 This amended the offence of sending a letter, electronic communication or article of any description 
which conveys a threat or abuse, pursuant to s 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (UK), to a 
triable either way offence. The amendment was made partly to tackle concerns over an increase in 
‘cyber-bullying’. 
19 This provision has made ‘revenge porn’ a specific triable either way offence. It is defined as 
‘[d]isclosing private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress’, and covers the sharing 
of images, both online and offline. This means that images posted over the internet and via social 
media, as well as those distributed by text message, email or in hard copy, are captured.  
20 For detailed analysis of this provision see James Price QC and Felicity McMahon (eds), Blackstone’s 
Guide to the Defamation Act 2013 (Oxford University Press, 2013) ch 6.  
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discouraged, and clearly have the potential to limit freedom of anonymous and 
pseudonymous speech. Therefore, they could be subject to challenge. However, it is 
likely that this would be met with strong arguments to the contrary, as the courts are 
unlikely to favour submissions that they should not be applied when they operate to 
protect victims of, for instance, cyber-bullying, revenge porn and defamatory 
attacks.21 
The existence or otherwise of a right to anonymity was considered in Author of a 
Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd22 as an element of personal privacy, as opposed to an 
aspect of the right to freedom of expression. The case concerned a blog, known as 
NightJack.23 The author of the blog used it as a platform for discussing his work as a 
serving police officer. Within these discussions he was extremely critical of 
government ministers and police operations. Indeed, in his judgment, Eady J was of 
the opinion that much of what the claimant published could be characterised as 
‘political speech’.24 The Times wanted to reveal the blogger’s identity;25 consequently 
he applied to the court for an interim injunction to restrain the newspaper from 
publishing any information that could lead to his identification as the person 
responsible for the blog. Hugh Tomlinson QC, on behalf of the claimant, argued in 
terms of his right to privacy. However, it is arguable that, additionally, some of the 
arguments were underpinned by the free speech rationale. Both the privacy and free 
speech arguments were predominantly based on the interests of the speaker. He 
advanced the argument that the claimant, and other bloggers, would be ‘horrified’ if 
their anonymity could not be protected,26 a proposition clearly based on the privacy 
rationale that anonymity (and by extension pseudonymity) allows speakers to keep 
certain information secret, including their identity.27 He submitted, firstly, as a general 
proposition, that ‘there is a public interest in preserving the anonymity of bloggers’.28 
It is submitted that this argument is founded on the free speech rationale, and is based, 
foremost, on speaker interests, as preserving the anonymity of bloggers enables them 
to exercise their right to impart information and ideas, as guaranteed by the ECHR art 
10(1) (and that, conversely, revealing their identity would restrict their right to do 
this).29 Secondly, he suggested that there was no public interest in the disclosure of 
the claimant’s identity, as the publication of such information would make no 
contribution to a debate of general interest.30 In giving judgment for the defendant, 
                                                
21 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 90. 
22 [2009] EMLR 22. 
23 Which, incidentally, had been awarded the Orwell Prize for citizen journalism in 2009. 
24 Author of a Blog [2009] EMLR 22 [24]. 
25 Interestingly, this case dealt with rather unique circumstances: The Times journalist had identified the 
claimant by deduction not, as was accepted by counsel for the claimant, by breach of confidence. 
Therefore, the matter related to whether an enforceable right to maintain anonymity existed in the 
situation where another person has been able to deduce the identity in question. Eady J recognised that 
bloggers generally may want to conceal their identity. However, in relying on Mahmood v Galloway 
[2006] EMLR 26, Eady J stated that it is a ‘significantly further step to argue, if others are able to 
deduce their [the claimant’s] identity, that they [The Times] should be restrained by law from revealing 
it’. Thus, potentially at least, the situation may be different if the identity of the speaker could not be 
deduced but, for example, a newspaper wanted to disclose it: ibid [3], [9]–[10]. 
26 Ibid [4]. 
27 Kaye, above n 4, [16]ff; Oster, European and International Media Law, above n 4, 47. 
28 [2006] EMLR 26 [5]. 
29 Ibid [18]. Of course, there is the secondary argument that preserving the anonymity of bloggers 
protects the audience interest in receiving information of public interest, as bloggers may be dissuaded 
from doing so should their identity be compromised. 
30 Ibid [22].  
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Eady J did not expressly accept or reject any arguments based on the free speech 
rationale by the claimant. However, he rejected the claimant’s application, and their 
privacy arguments, on the ground that ‘blogging is essentially a public rather than a 
private activity’,31 consequently the claimant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.32 He went on to state that even if this requirement had been met, the public 
interest in revealing that a police officer was expressing strong criticism of the police 
and political figures outweighed his right to privacy33 and that revealing his identity 
enabled readers to assess his veracity.34 Thus, the judgment seems, largely, to ignore 
any speaker-orientated arguments based on the free speech rationale advanced on 
behalf of the claimant and, rather, based on the interests of the audience, disagrees 
with counsel’s second argument. 
A discrete area of English law where the privacy rationale has successfully been 
applied to protect anonymity relates to Norwich Pharmacal orders.35 For instance, in 
Totalise plc v The Motley Fool Ltd36 the claimant had successfully applied for such an 
order for the disclosure by Motley Fool of the identity of a third party who had posted, 
pseudonymously, defamatory comments of the claimant on a bulletin board. In giving 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Aldous J said that in such cases ‘the court must 
be careful not to make an order which unjustifiably invades the right of the individual 
to respect for his private life’ and that there was ‘nothing in Article 10’ which 
supported the argument that ‘it protects the named but not the anonymous’ and that 
‘there are many situations in which … the protection of a person’s identity from 
disclosure may be legitimate’.37 Consequently, as observed by Arnold and Rajan, in 
the context of pseudonymity specifically:  
 
[c]onsistently with [Totalise] there have been cases … in which Norwich Pharmacal 
orders for the disclosure of the identities of pseudonymous persons posting on chatrooms 
and websites have been refused on the ground that the wrongs alleged against them did 
not justify invading their private lives.38 
 
Notwithstanding the jurisprudence relating to Norwich Pharmacal orders, Eady J’s 
judgment in Author of a Blog clearly suggests, and is indicative of the fact, that 
freedom of anonymous and pseudonymous speech enjoys very limited protection in 
modern English law. This case, along with Reno v American Civil Liberties Union,39 
are considered in more detail below, as they animate the problems associated with 
relying exclusively on either audience or speaker interests respectively. 
                                                
31 Ibid [11], [29], [33]. 
32 This is a threshold requirement for claimants pleading misuse of private information. 
33 [2009] EMLR 22 [21]–[23], [33]. 
34 Ibid 21. See analysis and criticisms of this point below. 
35 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133: Under the Norwich 
Pharmacal procedure the court can order that an individual or entity, who is not a party to the court 
proceedings but who is, innocently or not, mixed up in the wrongdoing, to assist a party to the 
proceedings by providing specified information or documents in respect of the proceedings. 
36 [2002] 1 WLR 1233. 
37 Ibid [25]. 
38 Arnold and Rajan, above n 5, 202. The cases cited by Arnold and Rajan include Sheffield Wednesday 
Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375 (QB) (18 October 2007) and Clift v Clarke [2011] 
EWHC 1164 (QB) (18 February 2011). See also Maureen Daly, ‘Is There an Entitlement to 
Anonymity? A European and International Analysis’ (2013) 35(4) European Intellectual Property 
Review 198. 
39 521 US 844 (1997). 
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Under s 2(1) of the HRA 1998 an English court must take account of decisions of 
the ECtHR, although any such ruling does not bind it. As a result, anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression could be subject to stronger protection under English law if 
there were a clear indication of the existence of a free speech anonymity right from 
the Strasbourg Court. However, the ECtHR has, to date, not been required to consider 
the extent to which a limit imposed on anonymous speech would render any such 
limit as incompatible with art 10 of the ECHR. If such an issue were to be brought 
before the Court, it is likely that a state would robustly argue for restrictions to be 
placed on anonymous expression, for example, on the basis that it needs to protect the 
right to respect for private life pursuant to the ECHR art 8, including the right to 
reputation, which can require, as discussed above in relation to s 5 of the Defamation 
Act 2013 (UK), disclosure of the speaker’s personal details. Additionally, far from 
providing clarity on the existence, or otherwise, of a right to freedom of anonymous 
speech conveyed online and via social media, ECtHR jurisprudence on the matter has 
been equivocal. In KU v Finland40 the Court held that any guarantee of privacy and 
freedom of expression rights for an individual placing an anonymous advertisement is 
not absolute, and must accord precedence to other rights and interests, such as the 
prevention of crime and the protection of rights of others. However, although the 
ECtHR decision in Delfi AS v Estonia41 seems to be based explicitly on audience 
interests in free speech,42 the Court afforded online anonymous communication a 
greater level of importance. Delfi, an internet news portal service, had been required 
by the Estonian courts to compensate the victim of threatening and defamatory 
comments which had been posted on its service, even though it operated a ‘notice-
and-take-down’ procedure when readers complained of these statements. The issue 
before the Court was whether or not there had been an infringement of the freedom of 
expression of the owner of Delfi. The Grand Chamber of the Court held that the 
Estonian Supreme Court’s ruling was compatible with the ECHR, stating that ‘[i]t is 
mindful … of the interest of internet users in not disclosing their identity’.43 
According to the Court, anonymity ‘is capable of promoting the free flow of ideas and 
information in an important manner, including, notably, on the internet’.44 
Consequently, it rejected Delfi’s argument that victims of defamatory statements must 
bring defamation proceedings against the authors of comments after their identity had 
been established.45 Other Council of Europe institutions have emphasised the 
importance of online anonymous communication. For instance, in Delfi the Court 
considered a Declaration of the Council of Ministers on freedom of communication 
on the internet.46 Principle 7 of the Declaration recognises that ‘to ensure protection 
against online surveillance and to enhance the free expression of information and 
ideas, member states should respect the will of users of the Internet not to disclose 
their identity’.47 Additionally, an earlier Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers had suggested recognition of anonymity in the context of internet 
                                                
40 European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 2872/02, 2 December 2008. 
41 European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 64569/09, 10 October 2013, upheld 
by the Grand Chamber of the Court on 16 June 2015. 
42 Speaker and audience interests are discussed below. 
43 Delfi AS v Estonia [2015] EMLR 26 [147]. 
44 Ibid [147]. 
45 Ibid [151]. 
46 Ibid [44]. 
47 Council of Europe, Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 28 May 2003, Principle 7 (Anonymity). 
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communications as an aspect of personal privacy protection.48 Although these 
provisions, and the Strasbourg Court’s decision in Delfi, do not, as yet, establish an 
absolute right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech, it is submitted that such 
explicit recognition of the importance of anonymous and pseudonymous expression 
from the ECtHR and Council of Europe institutions suggests that, in the correct 
circumstances, such a right could be brought into existence. As will be seen in the 
following section, the US position (and, to an extent, the position in Germany) is 
markedly different. In the US, a constitutional right to anonymous speech, both 
generally and online, has been consistently held to exist and has been protected. 
 
The German and US position: the Spickmich case and McIntyre v Ohio 
Elections Commission — an absolute right to anonymous and 
pseudonymous speech? 
 
Unlike the ECtHR’s equivocal stance on anonymous and pseudonymous online 
expression, German jurisprudence is clearer as to the courts’ adopted position. This is 
illustrated by the Spickmich case,49 which concerned a teacher who argued that her 
name, the details of her school and, specifically, anonymous assessments of her 
teaching by pupils should be removed from www.spickmich.de, a portal for 
community schools, which was accessible via registration, by providing the user’s 
name, email address and school details. The issue before the German courts 
concerned conflicting rights. On the one hand, the teacher submitted that the storage 
and publication of the information contravened her right to informational self-
determination — in that she should be able to determine what, if any, information 
should be made available to those with access to the portal. This privacy right is 
subject to robust protection under German law.50 However, on the other hand, the 
argument was advanced that, based on the right to freedom of expression, students 
should be able to assess the teaching qualities of their teachers anonymously. The 
Federal Supreme Court,51 in upholding the rulings of the lower court, dismissed the 
teacher’s complaint. The Court’s decision was founded on three key points: firstly, 
anonymity is an inherent aspect of the use of the internet;52 secondly, in any event, s 
13(6) of the Telemedia Act 2007 (Germany) protects anonymity and pseudonymity.53 
Pursuant to this provision, service providers must, as far as is technically possible and 
                                                
48 Council of Europe, Recommendation No R (99) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States for 
the Protection of Privacy on the Internet, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 February 1999, 
Guidelines 3 and 4. 
49 Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 196/08, 23 June 2009, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2009, 2888. 
50 The origins of the right to informational self-determination date back to 1983, when the German 
Federal Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional certain provisions of the Revised Census Act 
that had been adopted unanimously by the German Federal Parliament, but were challenged by diverse 
associations before the Constitutional Court. See Bundesverfassungsgerichts [German Constitutional 
Court], 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83, 15 December 1983 reported in (1983) 65 BVerfGE 1. 
See generally Antoinette Rouvroy and Yves Poullet, ‘The Right to Informational Self-Determination 
and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy’ in Serge 
Gutwirth et al (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer, 2009). 
51 The Bundesgerichtshof. 
52 Indeed, this had been recognised in an earlier decision of the Court, which held that contributors to a 
discussion forum must accept the risk of personal attack from pseudonymous participants: 
Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 101/06, 27 March 2007, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2007, 2558. 
53 Telemedia Act 2007 (Germany) 26 February 2007, BGBl I, 179, s 13(6). 
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reasonable, allow the anonymous or pseudonymous use of their services; and, finally, 
as a matter of principle, an obligation to identify an individual with the expression of 
a particular view would, both generally, and in the specific context of this case, lead 
to self-censorship from fear of the negative consequences of identification.54 The 
Court held that the imposition of such an obligation would be incompatible with art 
5.1 of the German Basic Law.55 At this juncture it is worth considering that the 
Court’s claim that ‘anonymity is an inherent aspect of the use of the Internet’ could be 
perceived as a naturalistic fallacy, and open to the rejoinder that just because 
anonymity is largely a part of cyber-culture, this does not force the conclusion that it 
ought to be that way. Instead, it is submitted that the judgment is more subtle and 
nuanced, as it does not impose a de facto ‘cyber-right’ to anonymity, but rather 
‘reveals the strong attachment’ of German law to the freedom to use online 
communications anonymously,56 in that it demonstrates that freedom of such speech 
takes precedence over the important countervailing right to informational self-
determination as an element of personal privacy. Thus, the reasoning of the Court is 
clearly indicative of a speaker interest-orientated approach. It is less equivocal than 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and demonstrates stronger support for speaker 
interests than is present in England. For instance, although the context of the cases are 
different, in Author of a Blog, in Eady J’s judgment, the speaker’s identity was 
required to enable the audience to assess the value of his publications. In other words, 
the public interest dimension of the speaker’s claim was impaired by anonymity.57 To 
the contrary, the blogger’s argument for anonymity was based on the fact that it 
allowed him (and other bloggers) to disseminate important information, as a 
whistleblower, without fear of reprisals from his employers or the state.58 This 
argument is, fundamentally, the same as the Court’s reasoning for dismissing the 
teacher’s complaint in Spickmich as, in the Court’s view, anonymity allowed the 
speaker (the children) to advance their honest view without fear of retribution. 
However, unlike the US position examined below, the Spickmich decision is not 
solely based on the interests of the speaker. Rather, it is submitted that the judgment 
also exhibits elements of an audience interest approach. This is on the basis that the 
free dissemination of information about the teacher enabled those with access to the 
portal to make an informed decision as to the performance of the teacher and the 
school. 
In the US there has been even stronger jurisprudential support for freedom of 
anonymous and pseudonymous online expression that is, therefore, diametrically 
opposed to the English position. The Supreme Court case of McIntyre v Ohio 
Elections Commission59 concerned Margaret McIntyre, who had distributed leaflets at 
public meetings at an Ohio school. The leaflets expressed opposition to a proposed 
school tax levy. McIntyre had produced the leaflets at home on her own computer. In 
some of the leaflets she was identified as the author. However, others were addressed 
from ‘Concerned Parents and Tax Payers’. She continued to distribute these particular 
leaflets despite being warned that they contravened § 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised 
                                                
54 Bundesgerichtshof [German Federal Court of Justice], VI ZR 196/08, 23 June 2009, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2009, [38]. 
55 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany] 
art 5.1. The Court also found that the portal facilitated the right of the students, parents and teachers to 
receive information, which is also protected by art 5.1: ibid [40]. 
56 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 153. 
57 Author of a Blog [2009] EMLR 22 [21]–[23]. 
58 Ibid [5]. 
59 514 US 334 (1995) (‘McIntyre’). 
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Code, pursuant to which authors were not permitted to write, print or disseminate 
campaigning literature without providing their name and address. Consequently, 
McIntyre was fined, a decision upheld by the Ohio State Supreme Court. As in Author 
of a Blog, the ‘speech’ in McIntyre was political in nature,60 as it engaged a state 
provision related specifically to ‘campaign literature’. It is submitted that the 
fundamental basis of the State Supreme Court’s judgment, founded on audience 
interests, is similar to Eady J’s reasoning in Author of a Blog, in which it was held 
that the blogger’s anonymity impaired the operation of the public interest as his 
identity was required to better enable the audience to determine his veracity.61 
According to the State Supreme Court, the burden placed on an author of campaign 
literature to identify themselves is ‘more than counterbalanced’ by the public interest 
in ‘providing the audience to whom the message is directed with a mechanism by 
which they may better evaluate its validity’ and enables the identification of authors 
publishing fraudulent and defamatory communications.62 Eventually, the case was 
heard by the US Supreme Court.63 Stevens J, giving the judgment of the Court, stated: 
‘an author’s decision to remain anonymous … is an aspect of the freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment’.64 As a result of this seminal ruling, which has 
been followed in a number of subsequent cases,65 enshrined within the First 
Amendment is an absolute free speech right to communicate anonymously or 
pseudonymously.66 
Two strands emerge from Stevens J’s judgment to justify the anonymity right.67 
The first is paradigmatic of the argument from democratic self-governance, as 
supported by the argument from self-fulfilment and, as is advanced below, goes to a 
speaker’s interest in anonymous expression. It advances a libertarian argument that 
‘[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority’68 and, according to Barendt, 
enables ‘radicals and dissenters to express unpopular views free from the fear of 
retaliation or prosecution’.69 This instrumental argument is clearly aligned to free 
speech rationale arguments in Author of a Blog,70 and the speaker interest-orientated 
reasons given by the Federal Supreme Court in the Spickmich case. Similarly, in an 
                                                
60 Author of a Blog [2009] EMLR 22 [24]. 
61 Ibid [21]–[23]. 
62 McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 618 NE 2d 152 (1993). The State Supreme Court relied on 
the case of First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978) in which it was held that not 
only are such interests sufficient to overcome the minor burden placed on individuals to disclose their 
identity in this context, but that these interests and pursuant regulations would survive constitutional 
scrutiny. 
63 McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US 334 (1995). 
64 Ibid 342. Ginsburg J and Thomas J gave separate concurring judgments. Thomas J gave an account 
of anonymous political writing in the US in the 18th century. From this examination he inferred that the 
Founding Fathers of the Constitution intended anonymous speech to be covered by the First 
Amendment: ibid 359–71. 
65 As Barendt observes, although the decision has been distinguished in cases relating to litigation 
concerning the disclosure of election expenditure, its ‘fundamental correctness’ has rarely been 
questioned within US jurisprudence: Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 56, ch 7.  
66 For example, see Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 US 557 
(1995); Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 US 182 (1999); Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society of New York v Stratton, 536 US 150 (2002); ACLU of Nevada v Heller, 378 F 3d 979 
(9th Cir, 2004).  
67 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas F Cotter, ‘Authorship, Audiences and Anonymous Speech’ 
(2006) 82 Notre Dame Law Review 1537, 1542–4. 
68 McIntyre, 514 US 334, 357 (1995). 
69 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 58. 
70 [2009] EMLR 22, [4], [18]. 
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earlier decision, the Supreme Court, in Talley v California,71 recognised ‘a tradition of 
anonymity in the advocacy of political causes’72 accordingly, in the absence of 
anonymity, valuable political speech may not be published.73 The second strand is 
rights-based. According to Stevens J ‘the identity of the speaker is no different from 
other components of the document’s content that the author is free to include or 
exclude’.74 Thus, an author is free to determine the contents of their publication, and 
they are entitled to write anonymously or pseudonymously. As a rejoinder to the 
contention that an audience may have a real interest in knowing the identity of the 
author to assess their credibility and the strength of their views, Stevens J employed 
the argument that to compel an individual to disclose their name (or any other 
identifying details) is equivalent to requiring them to express a particular opinion.75 
This argument is considered in more detail below. 
The McIntyre decision has been followed in the context of online 
communications76 and, therefore, by extension, would apply to social media speech. 
In ACLU v Zell Miller77 a federal district court held that a Georgia statute making it an 
offence to transmit messages over the internet using a false name was invalid, as it 
contravened the First Amendment. In the same year, in Reno v American Civil 
Liberties Union,78 the US Supreme Court, in determining that there was no basis for 
qualifying the protection afforded by the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of 
speech in the context of the internet, rejected the argument that the internet could be 
subject to similar special content regulation that had traditionally been applied to, and 
had constrained, broadcast media. In particular, the Court stated that although some of 
its earlier cases had recognised special justifications for regulation of the broadcast 
media, these are not necessarily applicable to other speakers.79 It was of the opinion 
that the factors it had relied upon in relation to the broadcast media80 ‘are not present 
in cyberspace’.81 Eady J’s judgment in Author of a Blog was based exclusively on 
audience interests. To the contrary, this decision was based entirely on the interests of 
the speaker. Both cases are considered again in the following section, which looks at 
the problems that are symptomatic of relying purely on one interest. Thus, the right to 
                                                
71 362 US 60 (1960). 
72 McIntyre, 514 US 334, 343 (1995). 
73 Barendt, Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 58. 
74 McIntyre, 514 US 334, 348 (1995). 
75 Ibid 348–9. Consequently, the Supreme Court rejected the Ohio State’s argument that the disclosure 
requirement was justified as it provided the audience with more information.  
76 However, the right to communicate anonymously on the internet is not absolute. For example, 
pursuant to Federal statute it is an offence to use a telecommunications device, without the user 
disclosing their identity, with intent to abuse, threaten or harass any specific individual. See 47 USC § 
223(a)(1)(c); Danielle Keats Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Harvard University Press, 2014) 124–
5. According to Barendt, this law would almost certainly survive constitutional challenge, as true 
threats, instilling a real fear of violence, are not protected by the First Amendment: Barendt, 
Anonymous Speech, above n 1, 126; Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette Inc v American 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F 3d 1058 (9th Cir, 2002). 
77 977 F Supp 1228 (ND Ga, 1997). 
78 521 US 844 (1997). 
79 Ibid 868–70. For instance, in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v FCC, 395 US 367, 399–400 (1969) 
and FCC v Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978) the Court relied on the history of extensive 
government regulation of the broadcast media. Other factors included (i) the scarcity of available 
frequencies at its inception (Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 637–8 (1994)); and 
(ii) its ‘invasive’ nature (Sable Communications of California Inc v FCC, 492 US 115, 128 (1989)). 
80 Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 US 844, 868–9 (1997). 
81 Ibid 869. 
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communicate anonymously, both online and offline, has now been accepted as an 
integral part of the First Amendment. 
This section has established that, at present, anonymous and pseudonymous online 
expression is faced with two opposing schools of thought. In England, freedom of 
expression provides a level of protection for such speech, whereas the US (and to a 
lesser extent, Germany) clearly recognises a constitutional right for these types of 
communication. What is apparent from the Strasbourg case law is that protection 
afforded for anonymous and pseudonymous expression, at the moment at least, falls 
short of a clearly recognised right and, consequently, seems to sit, rather opaquely, 
somewhere between the two sides. However, based on the explicit importance placed 
upon anonymous and pseudonymous speech by the ECtHR in Delfi and by Council of 
Europe provisions, there seems to be potential for the establishment of such a right. 
These schools of thought are based on opposing interests: those of the speaker and the 
audience. The following section will consider these rights, and how they apply to 
anonymous and pseudonymous speech communicated via social media and online. 
 
Justifications for online anonymity — speaker versus 
audience interests: an obsolete distinction in the context of 
social media speech? 
 
The speaker versus audience interests dichotomy has consistently been the subject of 
arguments relating to free speech generally.82 Within these arguments there has been a 
clear delineation between these ‘competing’ interests. The case law explored above 
demonstrates that, on the one hand, speaker interests in free speech (and privacy) 
have been used to support a right to anonymous expression, whereas, on the other 
hand, audience interests have tended to have been employed to argue for the author’s 
identity to be known or, at the very most, for a limited level of protection for 
anonymous speech.83 This section will discuss the problems associated with the 
exclusive application of each interest as a basis for free speech, particularly within the 
context of anonymous and pseudonymous online and social media communication, as 
has hitherto been the practice in England, the US and Europe. It will advance the 
argument that applying either interest exclusively to online and social media 
expression is problematic, for the following reasons: A US-type right to anonymous 
speech, based on speakers’ interests, goes too far. It does not adequately protect other 
countervailing rights and, inadvertently, protects speakers who disseminate harmful 
and damaging speech. However, the English and ECtHR positions that, at best, 
provide limited protection for anonymous speech, based on audience interests, do not 
                                                
82 For example, see Thomas Scanlon, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ (1972) 1 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 204; R M Dworkin, ‘Introduction’ in R M Dworkin (ed), The Philosophy of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1977) 1, 15; Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry 
(Cambridge University Press, 1982) 105–106, 158–60; Larry Alexander, Is There a Right to Freedom 
of Expression? (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 8–9; Seth F Kreimer, ‘Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet 
Letters; The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law’ (1991) 140 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 85–6; Robert C Post, ‘The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v Falwell’ (1990) 103 Harvard 
Law Review 603, 639–40. 
83 See Delfi AS v Estonia [2015] EMLR 26 above. 
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go far enough in protecting certain groups who, for instance, may use social media as 
a method to disseminate information of constitutional value.84 
 
Conflicting or complementary interests? Striking a balance 
between the speaker and the audience 
 
As already discussed, the Supreme Court’s decision in McIntyre is based on the right 
of the speaker to determine the contents of their speech. According to the Court, this 
speaker interest took precedence over the audience’s right to information regarding 
the speaker’s identity, in order for the reader to be able to properly assess the 
credibility of the author’s publication. In its judgment, the Supreme Court approved a 
New York court’s decision in New York v Duryea85 that, when it comes to anonymous 
sources, the public is able to determine the value of speech,86 as compared to 
communications from an identified speaker: 
 
Don’t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate the 
source of an anonymous writing. They can see it is anonymous. They know it is 
anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long as they are 
permitted, as they must be, to read the message. And then, once they have done so, it is 
for them to decide what is ‘responsible’, what is valuable, and what is truth.87 
 
The decisions that followed, in cases such as Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group of Boston,88 Buckley v American Constitutional Law 
Foundation,89 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v Stratton,90ACLU of 
Nevada v Heller91 and, in the context of online communication, ACLU and Reno,92 
were similarly based on speaker interests to support anonymous and pseudonymous 
expression. The interests of the speaker were also the dominant interests in the 
German Federal Supreme Court’s ruling in Spickmich. 
The US Supreme Court’s decision in Reno highlights some of the issues 
surrounding online and social media speech generally and, in particular, anonymous 
speech conveyed via these mediums. Thus, the efficacy of the judgment, based purely 
on speaker interests, if applied to a modern context, is questionable. Like Author of a 
Blog, it highlights problems symptomatic of applying one interest exclusively. The 
Court was of the opinion that ‘the Internet is not as invasive as radio or television’.93 
In coming to this decision, the Court relied upon the finding of the District Court that: 
 
Communications over the Internet do not invade an individual’s home or appear on one’s 
computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content by accident … [a]lmost all 
                                                
84 See Peter Coe, ‘Redefining “Media” Using a “Media-as-a-Constitutional-Component” Concept: An 
Evaluation of the Need for the European Court of Human Rights to Alter Its Understanding of “Media” 
Within a New Media Landscape’ (2017) 37(1) Legal Studies 25. 
85 351 NYS 2d 978, 995 (1974). 
86 Indeed, Post argues that speech should be assessed entirely divorced from the context in which it is 
made, including the origin of the communication: Post, above n 82, 639–40. 
87 New York v Duryea, 351 NYS 2d 978, 995 (1974), quoted in McIntyre, 514 US 334, 348 n 11 
(1995). 
88 515 US 557 (1995). 
89 525 US 182 (1999). 
90 536 US 150 (2002). 
91 378 F3d 979 (9th Cir, 2004). 
92 Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 521 US 844 (1997). See above. 
93 Ibid 869. 
  14 
sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content … odds are slim that 
a user would come across a sexually explicit sight by accident.94 
 
This decision is indicative of the pace at which online and social media 
communication has developed, as the findings upon which the decision is based are 
arguably at odds with current online expression. Internet communications, in 
particular those transmitted via social media, can be invasive. To an extent this may 
be ‘allowed’ by the user of the social media platform, by virtue of registering with the 
platform and joining particular communities. However, users are still subject to 
‘unbidden’ messages regularly appearing on their mobile telephone, tablet and laptop 
screens.95 Further, the availability of sexually explicit content has been proliferated by 
social media, and is synonymous with platforms such as WhatsApp and Snapchat, as 
demonstrated by the ‘revenge porn’ phenomenon.96 ‘Unbidden’ messages and content 
of a sexually explicit nature are, very often, anonymous or pseudonymous, meaning 
that there exists a lack of accountability which can seriously impact upon an 
individual’s ability to seek recourse, for instance in relation to damage caused to their 
reputation by virtue of libel proceedings (this is discussed in more detail below).97 
Contrary to judgments based purely on speaker interests, Kreimer suggests that, in 
many situations, anonymous or pseudonymous expression is not appropriate, as it is 
important for the audience to be able to identify the speaker. Knowing the origin of 
the speech enables the audience to attribute a value and assess the veracity of their 
previous communications, as they will be publicly accessible. Therefore, this allows 
them to evaluate their prior experience.98 This view is animated by Eady J’s judgment 
in Author of a Blog99 in which he upheld The Times’ argument that the public was 
entitled to know the identity of the author of the blog to assess the strength of his 
criticisms of the police force in which he was serving.100 Accordingly, Schauer and 
Alexander are of the opinion that free speech is predominantly concerned with 
audience interests. They believe that speakers enjoy only derivative rights, which are 
subject to protection only to ensure that the interests of the audience are 
safeguarded.101 Some social media platforms have adopted this stance in respect of 
their anonymity and pseudonymity policies. Facebook, for example, at least 
‘officially’, does not allow registration under a pseudonym.102 The platform believes 
that users are more responsible in debate and social commentary when they use the 
site under their real name.103 Similarly, between 2011 and 2014 Google+ required 
users to register under their ‘common name’ (the name by which they were known to 
family, friends and colleagues). It used an algorithm to detect likely pseudonyms, and 
automatically suspended these accounts, even when these users were generally known 
                                                
94 American Civil Liberties Union v Reno, 929 F Supp 824 (ED Pa, 1996) (finding 88). 
95 For detailed analysis of how the economic constructs of social media has influenced this issue see 
José van Dijck, The Culture of Connectivity (Oxford University Press, 2013) 163–76. 
96 Coe, ‘The Social Media Paradox’, above n 17, 28–9. See generally Brian Leiter, ‘Cleaning Cyber-
Cesspools: Google and Free Speech’ in Saul Levmore and Martha C Nussbaum (eds), The Offensive 
Internet (Harvard University Press, 2010) 155.  
97 Leiter, above n 96; Levmore, ‘The Internet’s Anonymity Problem’, above n 1. 
98 Kreimer, above n 82, 85–6. 
99 [2009] EMLR 22. See above for the facts of the case. 
100 Ibid [21]. 
101 Schauer, above n 82, 105–106; Alexander, above n 82, 8–9. 
102 Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked (Basic Books, 2012) 150. 
103 Facebook Guidelines of March 2015 for the removal of hate content, available at Facebook, 
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by a pseudonym or nickname. Google said that it introduced the policy to promote the 
safe use of the internet, and to prevent the dissemination of anonymous spam.104 The 
views of Kreimer, Schauer and Alexander, Eady J’s judgment, and Facebook’s policy 
correlate with Barendt’s argument that the case for freedom of speech dictates that, 
when it comes to general political and economic discourse, the public should know 
something about the credentials of the speaker. Equally, an audience wants to know 
the identity of the speaker to enable it to evaluate the worth of the publication.105 
It is submitted that these views, the decision in Author of a Blog, and Facebook’s 
policy are problematic, particularly in the context of anonymous and pseudonymous 
online and social media expression, for the following reasons. Firstly, they do not take 
into account the use of pseudonyms. If the audience is unaware that the speaker is 
communicating under a pseudonym they may not adjust the value they attribute to 
that respective communication.106 Secondly, knowing the speaker’s true identity does 
not, necessarily, add any value. Just because one can see the name of the speaker or 
author does not mean they can assess their credibility. This observation is particularly 
pertinent in respect of citizen journalism. These journalists, who may well be 
disseminating information of real constitutional value, may not have a ‘background’ 
to assess that is accessible to the public. In these circumstances, they may as well be 
acting under a pseudonym, as their real identity does not provide any usable 
information for the audience to evaluate. Equally, the traditional media increasingly 
rely on citizen journalists as a source of news. Consequently, speech is ‘recycled’ 
through traditional forms of media that may come from speakers that are identified 
but unknown, or from anonymous sources, or from speakers operating under a 
pseudonym. Thirdly (and directly linked to the points above), Facebook’s anonymity 
and pseudonymity policy relies on users to report fellow users using pseudonyms. In 
many instances, it is likely that these users will have no idea that a pseudonym is 
being used. Notwithstanding this, from a practical perspective, it is almost impossible 
for platforms such as Facebook to monitor and vet the millions of messages carried 
each week.107 Furthermore, it also conflicts with the advice given to police officers to 
use a pseudonym on social media to protect their identity. Many police officers do use 
pseudonyms for this purpose on Facebook, among other social media platforms. For 
the same reason, the General Medical Council supports the right of doctors to use 
social media anonymously or pseudonymously.108 Incidentally, Facebook’s real name 
policy has been held to infringe German data protection law.109 Finally, the problems 
that could potentially flow from the decision in Author of a Blog are, like Reno, in 
respect of speaker interests, symptomatic of applying audience interests exclusively. 
These judgments illustrate the need for a balance to be struck between both interests. 
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There is currently an abundance of blogs, similar to Night Jack, that disseminate 
information of constitutional value.110 Because the decision required the author to 
identify himself it surely has the propensity to dissuade other people (and 
whistleblowers) from communicating in a similar way. 
The decision in Author of a Blog also illustrates a challenge faced by citizen 
journalists.111 Because, in most circumstances, these journalists are not considered 
‘media’, they are not subject to the enhanced right to media freedom. As a result, they 
cannot avail themselves of a journalist’s immunity from being required to disclose 
sources of information. If the author of the blog would have taken his ‘story’ to The 
Times, rather than publish it on his blog, the newspaper may have published it, and 
then refused to identify its source because it, as a recognised media entity, would not 
have had to disclose its source pursuant to the right to media freedom. In doing so, it 
would have argued that the public interest in the story took precedent over any interest 
the police force had in identifying the whistleblower. The judgment, based 
exclusively on audience interests, seems to favour the traditional media, in that, by 
virtue of the right to media freedom, it is immune from disclosing its sources, yet it is 
also able to identify a respected citizen journalist who independently publishes a story 
for which it could claim journalists’ privilege.112 
Taking this argument a step further, as well as bestowing certain privileges on the 
media, the right to media freedom carries with it duties and responsibilities, including 
transparency.113 The journalistic media is subject to a right of reply.114 Therefore, at 
least within a European context, the media has to make available certain information 
about the publisher or editor. 115 As Oster states, ‘[w]hile anonymity is part of 
freedom of expression, responsible journalism requires that at least the editor of the 
publication be immediately identifiable in order to facilitate effective protection 
against defamation and privacy violation’.116 This duty runs counter to a culture of 
anonymity and pseudonymity prevalent on the internet and social media, and very 
often practised by citizen journalists. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that a blogger, 
such as the author of NightJack, is not considered media, and therefore not subject to 
media freedom, even if they were, the fact that that they are the ‘source’, ‘author’ and 
‘publisher’ would mean that they would not be fulfilling their journalistic 
responsibilities pursuant to the right if they published anonymously or under a 
pseudonym. In contrast, a journalist for The Times could use their editor or publishing 
company of the newspaper to ‘shield’ their identity. Herein lies a significant challenge 
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for citizen journalists: what is relevant to the concept of responsible journalism is that 
a person, whether that be the journalist or their editor, or an organisation, such as the 
publishing company, claims responsibility for a publication, and can, as a result, be 
held liable. For example, it is the policy of The Economist to publish all of its articles 
anonymously. However, it is clear that The Economist Newspaper Ltd is responsible 
for its articles, and can, therefore, be held liable for them. Consequently, both the The 
Economist, and its journalists, in respect of this at least, comply with their journalistic 
responsibilities. To the contrary, because of the nature of citizen journalism, in 
particular the fact that many bloggers operate alone as both the author and the 
publisher, means they do not have the ‘shield’ of an identifiable editor or organisation 
that could be held liable. If they did, this would defeat the very purpose of their 
anonymity or pseudonym. However, by not providing the details of an identifiable 
person or organisation they are not conforming to the concept of responsible 
journalism. Ultimately, this challenge faced by citizen journalists could undermine the 
value of such journalism and, paradoxically, damage audience interests, as less people 
will engage with it, which will, in turn, hinder democratic participation and self-
fulfilment. 
Barendt suggests that the rights and interests of speakers, distinct from those of 
the audience are ‘emphasised’ by the argument from self-fulfilment, in that ‘speech is 
an essential aspect of the right to self-development and fulfilment, or of individual 
autonomy, and so must be respected as an aspect of that autonomy’.117 Baker takes 
this further. He argues that the right to freedom of expression should take precedence 
over countervailing rights because it facilitates autonomy — by allowing individuals 
to exercise self-expression or self-disclosure, they control whether or not to reveal 
themselves to others and enables the respective individual to be treated as 
autonomous.118 According to Barendt this argument is problematic. He suggests that 
the argument from self-fulfilment is the ‘least plausible rationale’ for freedom of 
speech and that it would be ‘odd’ to base the right to free speech on the speaker’s 
interest in self-development or fulfilment. Specifically, he states: ‘[h]ow does the 
mask of anonymity claimed by someone who prefers to remain nameless or to publish 
under the disguise of a pseudonym advance that person’s self-development as an 
individual?’119 It is submitted that the position adopted by Barendt is flawed, in 
respect of anonymous and pseudonymous expression conveyed by both the traditional 
media and, in particular, online and via social media, for the reasons discussed below. 
In Reno, District Judge Dalzell stated that the internet is ‘the most participatory 
form of mass speech yet developed’.120 Social media platforms, blogs, email and chat 
rooms are a way of not only receiving information, but of transmitting views on any 
topic instantaneously; they have facilitated a convergence of audience and 
producer.121 Thus, anonymity and pseudonymity is a culturally inherent aspect of 
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online and social media communication.122 According to Suler the ability to 
communicate anonymously is a principal factor for online disinhibition effect, 
whereby people are less inhibited to say things online which they would not say in a 
‘real life’ encounter. It allows them to hide their identity and to operate under the 
assumption, at least, that their real identities cannot be linked to messages they send, 
and so they cannot be held responsible for the consequences of that expression.123 In 
this context, the ‘mask’ of anonymity or the ‘disguise’ of a pseudonym can advance a 
person’s self-development as it gives them a voice in circumstances where, without 
anonymity or pseudonymity, they would not be able to express themselves. A 
pertinent example is academic speech. One only has to look at Times Higher 
Education to see regular instances of academics writing anonymously about 
controversial issues within their University, or higher education generally. Of even 
greater significance is academic speech in countries where academics fear persecution 
for expressing views.124 In both of these examples, arguably academics are 
developing intellectually. In these types of situations where they could not, or would 
not want to, reveal their identity through fear of persecution or reprisals, by virtue of 
being able to express themselves anonymously or under a pseudonym, they are able to 
engage in dialogue with other academics and/or the process of research, writing and, 
ultimately, peer review of their work (which tends to be conducted anonymously in 
any event125). Of course, the rejoinder to this argument is that such disinhibition, by 
virtue of anonymity and pseudonymity, can potentially act as a catalyst for 
irresponsible and unacceptable behaviour in online and social media forums (this is 
discussed in greater depth below). 
It has been argued that Mill’s argument from truth and the argument from 
democratic self-governance are, predominantly, associated with audience interests.126 
Indeed, in relation to the argument from democratic self-governance, and in the 
context of the regulation of speech at public meetings, Meiklejohn was of the opinion 
that it is important that ‘not every one shall get to speak, but that everything worth 
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saying shall be said’.127 However, in McIntyre the Supreme Court justified the 
existence of a right to anonymous and pseudonymous expression as a protection 
against the tyranny of the majority.128 Consequently, an additional argument to 
support a right to anonymity based on speaker interests is that without such a right 
speakers would not participate at all in political discourse. According to scholars such 
as Dworkin, Post and Redish, such a right is incorporated within a speaker’s right to 
contribute to public life.129 It is submitted that the argument from democratic self-
governance, and the argument from self-fulfilment, do not operate exclusively from 
each other as justifications for anonymous and pseudonymous speech. To the 
contrary, self-fulfilment is an integral and supportive aspect of an individual’s ability 
to participate in democratic discourse. The argument from democratic self-
governance, as supported by the argument from self-fulfilment, is particularly 
pertinent to online and social media communication, as it supports the primary 
rationale for a right to anonymous speech within these arenas; anonymous expression 
enables more people to engage in public discourse and, in so doing, contribute 
valuable information and ideas to society than would be the case if their speech were 
inhibited by a requirement to disclose their identity. Indeed, David Kaye, the UN 
Rapporteur on the promotion of freedom of expression, has robustly supported a right 
to communicate anonymously online. Kaye’s support of anonymous communication 
on the internet is indicative of a combination of the arguments advanced above in that, 
in authoritarian countries, there will be universal reluctance to speak freely and 
contribute to public and political discourse, both online and offline, for fear of 
persecution.130 As Barendt states: ‘[a]nonymity enables the circumvention of the 
myriad restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression imposed by authoritarian 
governments’.131 It can also facilitate democratic participation in liberal societies 
more tolerant of political dissent.132 In fact, the example of academic speech in 
relation to self-fulfilment given above is equally applicable to this point. Anonymity 
is essential for individuals wishing to express views that may expose them to 
disciplinary action or dismissal by their employer, or ostracism from colleagues.133 
These are the very reasons why Eady J’s judgment in Author of a Blog, based 
exclusively on audience interests, is so fundamentally flawed. Paradoxically, rather 
than protecting the audience, by potentially dissuading individuals from participating 
in citizen journalism, it damages audience interests, as less people are exposed to 
information that may have a constitutional value. This can limit their engagement 
with democratic discourse and hinder their self-fulfilment. Equally, according to 
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Stein, protection of anonymous and pseudonymous speech, particularly in 
‘cyberspace’, ‘provides a context’ for lesbians and gay men ‘in which to speak freely, 
without identifying themselves, and without having to be physically present to 
communicate with others’.134 This can be extended to vulnerable groups, such as 
asylum-seekers, immigrants and the mentally and physically disabled, amongst others, 
in that, for the same reasons, anonymity and pseudonymity enables them to exercise 
their freedom of speech and, therefore, not only develop intellectually, but also 
participate in, and contribute to, public discourse.135 However, there is a robust 
rejoinder to this argument. Thomas Scanlon’s individual autonomy concept, which is 
based on the right of the audience to receive information, be exposed to every type of 
argument and be free from governmental intrusion into the process of individual 
decision-making,136 is equally applicable, as access to minority views, that may not be 
available without anonymous or pseudonymous communication, are an essential 
aspect of audience rights. 
Thus, where social media and online communication are concerned, speakers have 
a particularly strong claim to the right to freedom of expression137 and, by extension, 
the right to communicate anonymously or pseudonymously. This is because the 
convergence of audience and producer, which has been created by social media and 
online expression, has, in turn, given rise to the ascendance of citizen journalism. 
Consequently, free speech is facilitated by the fact that these speakers are not subject 
to, for instance, political bias, censorship, the influence of media ownership and 
editorial control, at least to the same extent as they would be within the context of the 
mass media,138 where greater emphasis is usually placed on the interest of the 
audience who, to assess the reliability of the journalist or broadcaster, are concerned 
with being apprised of that individual’s identity.139 Ekstrand argues that those who 
communicate online and, by extension, via social media, are more likely to tolerate 
anonymity, either because it is generally accepted that anonymous and pseudonymous 
communication is ‘normal’ in these arenas140 or because their expectations are lower 
as to the reliability of the information provided or the expertise of those responsible 
for disseminating the information.141 To the contrary, Citron suggests that certain 
aspects of the internet may make online communication potentially more damaging 
than information disseminated offline.142 There is no doubt this can be extended to 
social media. A consequence of the way in which social media and online 
communication has become ingrained within our social cultural fabric is that habits, 
conventions and social norms, that were once informal manifestations of social life, 
are now infused within these methods of communication. What were casual and 
ephemeral actions and/or acts of expression, such as conversing with friends or 
colleagues, swapping/displaying pictures, or exchanging thoughts that were once kept 
private or maybe shared with a select few, have now become formalised and 
permanent. These actions and expressions are, in the click of mouse, or the flick of a 
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finger, publicised for the world to see. Thus, unlike broadcasts or newsprint, that are 
perceived to be more transitory in nature, and are ‘tomorrow’s fish and chips’ 
paper’,143 online communication lends itself to permanency;144 it enters the public 
domain, with the potential for long-lasting and far-reaching consequences.145 Search 
engines, such as Google, provide users with links to harmful communications. These 
can remain accessible to the public, sometimes for very long periods of time, and 
certainly longer than with the traditional media, after they were initially published.146 
This can have negative and long lasting effects on individuals’ lives. For instance, 
research carried out by the Chartered Institute of Personnel found that two out of five 
employers look at candidates’ online activity or social media profiles to inform their 
recruitment decisions.147 Realistically, this is likely to be even higher, as many 
employers do not ‘officially’ screen applicants. 
The fact that information disseminated online and via social media can, 
potentially, remain available permanently, and is easily accessible by anybody, gives 
rise to three further issues, which are amplified by anonymous and pseudonymous 
expression: (i) the absence of ‘responsible’ intermediaries, which is conducive to (ii) 
the proliferation of fake news and (iii) the fact that victims of, for instance, cyber-
bullying, hate crime and defamation are not able to identify the origin of the 
communication. Consequently, these harms form the foundation for a strong audience 
interest-based argument against a right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech; they 
provide support for the restriction of anonymous and pseudonymous speech in an 
online or social media context. This argument, considered through the lens of these 
harms, informs the remainder of this section. 
In The Offensive Internet, Levmore points to the distinction between the 
traditional media and, in particular, social media.148 He states that, with the traditional 
media (including the press, broadcasting and book and journal publishing), the danger 
posed by anonymity is mitigated by the presence of an active intermediary.149 In these 
contexts the journalist, editor or publisher can vouch for the integrity and reliability of 
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their source, author or speaker. They can also check the story prior to publication or 
broadcast and, if need be, refer it to their legal team to prevent the dissemination of 
any material that may present disproportionate legal risks. To the contrary, it is 
unusual for online intermediaries to assume this responsibility for two reasons. 
Firstly, there has been a disinclination amongst social media companies to play the 
role of arbiter, as this leaves them open to claims of censorship.150 This stance is 
clearly based on speaker interests. Secondly, due to the volume of online and social 
media communications, monitoring content is extremely difficult for social media 
platforms and website operators.151 For Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’) acting as 
conduits for the transmission of messages, monitoring such content is impossible.152 
These reasons pose a significant challenge for these mediums that have, traditionally, 
supported the interest of the speaker.153 They are under increasing pressure to be able 
to identify authors of, for instance, defamatory material, revenge porn, cyber-bullying, 
hate speech and communications inciting terrorism to enable successful civil actions 
and/or criminal prosecutions.154 This issue is animated by the recent ‘fake news’ 
phenomenon.155 Social media platforms are being asked to deal with the proliferation 
of fake news on their sites.156 Facebook, in particular, has been the subject of strong 
criticism in the wake of the 2016 US election.157 This led to the platform introducing 
audience interest-based measures to deal with the issue of fake news (it announced 
that it will be partnering with a third-party fact-checking organisation) whilst, at the 
same time, reiterating its speaker interest-based commitment to ‘giving people a 
voice’ and that it ‘cannot become an arbiter of truth’,158 with Mark Zuckerberg 
stating: 
 
We believe in giving people a voice, which means erring on the side of letting people 
share what they want whenever possible. We need to be careful not to discourage sharing 
of opinions or to mistakenly restrict accurate content.159 
 
It is submitted that pressure to act as intermediaries that censor material may deter 
social media platforms, website operators and ISPs from providing their service 
and/or encourage them to act as arbiters of truth. This, in turn, could have a chilling 
effect on freedom of expression. The criticism leveled at social media platforms in 
respect of their reluctance to act as proactive intermediaries in the context of fake 
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news, and the consequential response of the sites, are indicative of the challenges that 
emanate from the apparent conflict between the perceived roles of these platforms, 
and whether they should be required to operate as media or as technology 
companies.160 It also clearly demonstrates that basing social media expression 
exclusively on one or other right is not appropriate. Instead, a combination of the two 
is required to provide an enhanced level of protection for anonymous and 
pseudonymous expression. 
In contrast to social media platforms such as Facebook, that have adopted real 
name policies,161 some sites have implemented policies that enable their users to 
communicate under a pseudonym or anonymously. Examples include sites such as 
Social Number, Gaia Online, Evsum and Anonyming.162 According to Bartlett and 
Citron, a particularly notorious site is 4chan, which has become synonymous with 
trolling, the dissemination of pornographic material, internet attacks and threats of 
violence.163 Herein lies the problem with online expression communicated 
anonymously or pseudonymously; it can prevent, or at least make it very difficult, for 
a victim of cyber-bullying, revenge porn, hate speech or defamation to identify the 
origin of the speech. The fact that they are unaware of the perpetrator, and their 
proximity to them, can make the harm suffered more acute.164 This is illustrated by a 
number of cases from different jurisdictions. In 2007, several pseudonymous posts 
sexually abusing and threatening named female law students at Yale University were 
disseminated by the US social media site AutoAdmit.165 The victims were successful 
in obtaining a court order requiring the platform to identify the perpetrators.166 The 
Latvian-based social media site Ask-fm has been linked to anonymous cyber-bullying 
for a number of years.167 In 2013 bullying on the site allegedly led to the suicide of 
Hannah Smith, a 14-year-old from Leicestershire, UK.168 The Canadian newspaper, 
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The Globe and Mail, reported in 2016 that at least seven teen suicides, from countries 
around the world, are the result of anonymous cyber-bullying emanating from the 
site.169 Also in 2013, Reece Elliot of South Shields, UK used a pseudonym to threaten 
to kill two hundred students at a school in the US State of Tennessee on a memorial 
Facebook page for a fellow student killed in a car crash. The threats caused thousands 
of students to stay away from the school. Consequently, Elliot was convicted of 
sending ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘menacing’ messages contrary to s 127 of the 
Communications Act 2003 (UK).170 In the same year, in the UK, Isabella Sorley and 
John Nimmo used Twitter to anonymously tweet threats of violence, including rape, 
to Caroline Criado-Perez for campaigning for a woman to appear on Bank of England 
notes, and to Stella Creasy MP for supporting Criado-Perez’s campaign. According to 
Judge Riddle the tweets’ anonymity heightened the victims’ fear, as they had no way 
of knowing the danger posed by perpetrators, or how to recognise and avoid them.171 
Like Elliot, they were convicted of the s 127 offence. 
The absence of proactive intermediaries, the ubiquity of fake news and, as 
illustrated by the examples above, the fact that victims of, for example, cyber-bullying 
and defamation are unable to easily identify the origins of the offending 
communication reinforce Levmore’s contention that anonymous online 
communication has made it ‘the preferred medium for juvenile communications’.172 
They also support the argument that a constitutionally protected US-style speaker 
interest-based absolute right to anonymous and pseudonymous speech could be 
claimed by anybody, including those disseminating fake news, or engaging in cyber-
bullying, revenge porn, hate crimes, harassment or defamation. However, despite this, 
it is a non-sequitur that an audience interest-based argument, dictating that social 
media platforms, website operators and ISPs should require users to identify 
themselves, prevails (as has happened in authoritarian countries such as China173). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has established the benefits of anonymous and pseudonymous expression, 
particularly online and via social media: it facilitates free speech by enabling more 
people to communicate and exchange ideas and information. As a result, it fuels 
greater participation in public discourse and facilitates self-fulfilment. If this type of 
speech is restricted or prohibited, based on an audience interest approach, then these 
tangible advantages will be lost. Consequently, as advanced in relation to Author of a 
Blog, this, paradoxically, can damage the interests of the audience as it may dissuade 
people from engaging with this form of media and contributing to valuable citizen 
journalism that, in turn, could limit the amount of people able to participate in 
democratic discourse. Furthermore, the benefits gained by the audience from 
requiring speakers to identify themselves, particularly in respect of online and social 
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media expression, is questionable; it does not, necessarily, enable the audience to 
accurately assess the credentials of the speaker and, therefore, the value of the 
communication. However, free speech based entirely on speaker interests and, in 
particular, the existence of a US-style constitutionally protected right to communicate 
anonymously and pseudonymously is equally as problematic, as it inadvertently 
protects speakers engaging in unwanted and damaging speech. 
How lawyers, judges and speakers and audiences in all contexts of speech 
proceed is not an easy question to answer, and requires more research and debate. 
Ultimately, however, what this article has ascertained is that a balance needs to be 
struck between the competing speaker and audience interests. For the reasons outlined 
above, and in the prevailing sections, anonymous and pseudonymous expression 
should be allowed to continue, albeit not without qualification. For instance, in the 
context of online expression, upon being notified by the victims of harmful and 
damaging speech or by the authorities, social media platforms, website operators and 
ISPs should immediately suspend the offending perpetrator’s account. They should 
also assist the authorities and the victims of crimes or defamatory allegations by 
identifying the perpetrators of the harmful speech for the purpose of legal 
proceedings. As Citron advocates, users who have previously been allowed to 
communicate anonymously or under a pseudonym, but who have abused that 
privilege by engaging in, for instance, hate speech or cyber-bullying, should be 
prevented from doing so in the future by being required to use their real name.174 
                                                
174 Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, above n 76, 239.  
